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Commentary:
A Response to Professor Berger
The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere
Restraint on Government
Randolph N. Jonakait*
Professor Berger and I agree that the Supreme Court has
misconstrued the role of the Confrontation Clause. According
to the Court, "the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to ad-
vance... the accuracy of the truth-determining process."' This
interpretation of the provision's purpose has reduced confronta-
tion from an important constitutional right to "a minor adjunct
of evidence law."2 We also agree that confrontation cannot be
properly interpreted by looking at the Clause in isolation. Its
true meaning can be determined only by examining its context:
the Sixth Amendment.3
At this point, however, our paths diverge. Professor Ber-
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
2. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Corfrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 622 (1988). As I have argued earlier:
[The Supreme Court's] accepted primary purpose for confrontation
now coincides with the central object of evidence law. This causes the
constitutional provision's subordination to evidence law ....
The confrontation clause, in spite of its actual words extending a
right to the accused, no longer expressly safeguards the accused. In.
stead, it is a protection which everyone in society, as represented by
the prosecutor, can demand. . . . If the Court's assessment of the
clause's mission is correct, the confrontation clause can no longer be
understood as a right protecting the accused.
Id. at 580-81.
Professor Berger concludes that the Supreme Court "has transformed a
constitutional guarantee [of confrontation] into an evidentiary doctrine.... "
Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause:
A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 557
(1992).
3. See Berger, supra note 2, at 559-61; see also Jonakait, supra note 2, at
581 ('The Court... has divined [confrontation's] purpose ... by examining it
in isolation.... The confrontation clause, however, does not sit by itself in the
Constitution. It has a context; it is but one provision of the sixth
amendment.").
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ger sees confrontation as directly curbing the government's se-
cret generation of evidence.4 Government abuses, of course, are
part of the reason for the Sixth Amendment. Abuses can be
prevented not only by directly restraining the government, but
also by affirmatively granting rights to the people. The Sixth
Amendment follows that latter path. It operates not as a direct
restraint on abusive governmental practices, but as a grant of
positive rights to those charged with a crime.
A brief look at the Sixth Amendment should illustrate that
provision's basic framework. For example, the counsel provi-
sion does not merely restrain the government. Instead, it af-
firmatively grants a right to the accused. As Gideon v.
Wainwright5 establishes, the Sixth Amendment is violated not
just when the government prevents an accused from being rep-
resented by an attorney, but also when an accused who cannot
afford a lawyer does not have one.6 Since the right to counsel
is an affirmative grant to the accused and not just a restraint on
government, the court must appoint an attorney for the
indigent.7
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right, too, is not just a re-
4. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 2, at 586. Professor Berger states, "Thus,
two hundred years ago when the Bill of Rights was enacted, the right to con-
frontation was viewed in conjunction with the other procedural rights sur-
rounding trial by jury. Confrontation was part of an arsenal designed not only
to ensure accurate results in criminal trials but also to restrain the govern-
ment in criminal trials from acting in a covert, repugnant manner that would
be concealed from the people." I
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Id. at 344 (precedents, reason, and reflection "require us to recognize
that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.").
7. The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel remains an affirmative grant
to the accused even though Gideon has been limited so that indigents charged
with misdemeanors and not sentenced to jail are not entitled to the appoint-
ment of counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (clarifying the Court's
holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
The Supreme Court's interpretation of a component of the counsel guar-
antee, the right to effective assistance of counsel, further illustrates that point.
The Court has explained:
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it inter-
feres in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent
decisions about how to conduct the defense. Counsel, however, can
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by
failing to render 'adequate legal assistance.'
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (citations omitted). The accused is entitled to effective
assistance even if the government was not the cause of the ineffective
assistance.
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straint on the government. The prosecution could not win an
appeal by arguing: "We agree that the defendant did not get a
jury trial as he wished, but that was not our fault." The ques-
tion is not what the prosecution did, but whether the accused
got a trial by jury. The guarantee is a positive one; under the
Sixth Amendment the accused is affirmatively granted the
right to a trial by jury.8
Compulsory process is also an affirmative grant to the ac-
cused. This provision gives a defendant the right to produce
witnesses. It does not merely forbid governmental interference
with the accused's attempt to produce his witnesses. Compul-
sory process is not merely a restraint on the government. It is
an affirmative right of the accused.9
As these rights illustrate, and as a comprehensive examina-
tion would confirm,10 the Sixth Amendment is not a collection
of negatives. Instead, the provision grants positive guarantees
to the accused." We measure these rights not from the govern-
8. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) ("[In the
American States, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial
for serious offenses is a fundamental right.").
9. Instead of labelling the Sixth Amendment components as affirmative
rights of the accused, the amendment could be said to place duties on the gov-
ernment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972) ("A defendant has no
duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of
insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.").
This alternative phrasing, however, states nothing different than that the
Sixth Amendment affirmatively grants rights to the accused. If the govern-
ment has a duty to give the accused something, such as a jury trial, then the
accused has a right to it. A provision that imposes an affirmative duty on the
government to furnish a right is not the same as a provision that restrains odi-
ous governmental behavior.
10. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) (referring to the "ac-
cepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused").
11. These affirmative rights could be phrased as a restraint on govern-
ment because the state is prevented from convicting an accused unless the ac-
cused has a jury trial, a lawyer, been given notice, and so forth. See, e.g.,
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) ("The right to counsel prevents the
States from conducting trials at which persons who face incarceration must de-
fend themselves without adequate legal assistance."). Although semantics al-
lows this phrasing, the Cuyler Court treated a Sixth Amendment provision as
an affirmative right. Id The Court considered whether different standards
for retained and appointed counsel should be employed to determine ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. Id Since the state plays a greater role when coun-
sel is appointed than when counsel is privately retained, a governmental
restraint model should lead to stricter standards for appointed counsel. If ef-
fective assistance of counsel is an affirmative grant to the accused, the ap-
pointed or retained status of counsel does not matter. The Court correctly
treated the right to effective assistance of counsel as an affirmative right. It
stated: "Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State
1992]
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ment's viewpoint, but from the defendant's. The controlling
question is not what did the government do, but what did the
defendant get. Did he get a jury? Did he get an attorney? Did
he get notice? Did he get the chance to produce witnesses? and
so on.
If confrontation is to be truly a constitutional right, it must
be treated the same way as the other Sixth Amendment rights.
The Court has not treated it as such.12 Similarly, because Pro-
fessor Berger does not treat confrontation as a right affirma-
tively granted to the accused, her proposal would also make
confrontation inconsistent with other Sixth Amendment
guarantees.
Confrontation, correctly interpreted, is a much broader and
more powerful guarantee than the restraint model would have
it. For example, the restraint model would be concerned with a
co-conspirator declaration elicited by a government agent.13 It
would not examine the same declaration reported by a person
who, after the hearsay was uttered, cut a deal with the prosecu-
tion. The restraint model would find a different constitutional
treatment for a child's abuse accusation depending on whether
the statement was made to a government doctor or to the fam-
ily physician or, perhaps, to a public or private school nurse.
The admissibility of an excited utterance could depend on
whether it was made to a civilian bystander or to a police of-
ficer. Since, however, the Sixth Amendment grants rights to
the accused requiring an analysis from the accused's perspec-
tive, the same. framework should apply to each of those paired
statements. They are not fundamentally different for Sixth
Amendment purposes.
In Idaho v. Wright,14 for example, the child did not testify.
Instead, the child's accusations against the defendant were
presented to the jury through a doctor, who testified about
statements the child made to him. Professor Berger, to fit
in the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction be-
tween retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defend-
ants who must choose their own lawyers." Id at 344-45.
Once the state has chosen to prosecute, the Sixth Amendment affirma-
tively grants rights to the accused. Indeed, the opening words of the amend-
ment indicate precisely this scheme: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to.. ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
12. See Jonakait, supra note 2, at 580-81; Berger, supra note 2, at 557-60.
13. Berger, supra note 2, at 561 ("Hearsay statements procured by agents
of the prosecution or police should ... stand on a different footing than hear-
say created without governmental intrusion.").
14. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
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Wright into her framework, concludes that the doctor "func-
tioned as an agent of the prosecution,"1 5 although there was no
finding to this effect in the case.
From the accused's perspective, however, the functional
status of the doctor is irrelevant. Assume that the girl was in a
private day care center and a worker there thought the girl was
being abused by the accused. If the worker takes her to the
school's doctor, who then interviews the child in precisely the
same way that the doctor in Wright did-that is in a "sugges-
tive manner,"16 as the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, and fo-
cusing "exclusively on the child's activities with" the accused,17
as Professor Berger puts it-precisely the same evidence would
be generated as was presented in the actual case.
To the defendant, the evidence is the same in each situa-
tion, and whether "the accused... enjoy[ed] the right... to be
confronted with witnesses against him . . . ,.18 as the Sixth
Amendment commands, must be the same in both situations.
Determining whether the doctor was acting as a government
agent or as a private party tells us nothing important about
whether the accused was allowed to confront the child. To
treat them differently is to treat confrontation as something
other than a Sixth Amendment right.19
Professor Berger's historical examination does not con-
vince me otherwise. A confrontation history relying primarily
on English political trials is incomplete at best. Although they
have failed to do so, confrontation scholars must also examine
the development of criminal procedure in colonial America.20
This is necessary because American criminal law and procedure
took a sharply different course from that of the English. The
American path led to the Sixth Amendment, which does not
simply incorporate English common law, but instead, in crucial
ways, rejects it.
15. Berger, supra note 2, at 603.
16. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3152.
17. Berger, supra note 2, at 603.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
19. This conclusion, of course, does not tell us how the statements of the
child should be treated or more generally what the right to confrontation is. I
have concluded elsewhere that confrontation must be read with the right to
notice, counsel, and compulsory process, and that together these rights "guar-
antee to an accused that he can defend himself through our adversary system."
Jonakait, supra note 2, at 582.
20. I fall into this category of having analyzed confrontation without hav-
ing examined this relevant history. My comments here can only suggest his-
torical areas that ought to be explored.
1992]
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England viewed criminal violations as a private matter be-
tween individuals. Except for political offenses, which were
crimes against the king, the victim or his friends or relatives
prosecuted a case, not the government.2' The king's attorney
prosecuted political offenses and, not surprisingly, the law de-
veloped differently in such cases than in other criminal mat-
ters: Many more protections were granted an accused in
political trials than in ordinary felony prosecutions.22
Colonial America, on the other hand, viewed crimes not as
matters between individuals, but as offenses against the state.2
Ordinary criminal cases and political trials were treated alike,
not as two separate entities as in England. As was only natural
in a society that viewed all crimes as fundamentally the same,
Americans were seriously concerned with preventing injustices
in all criminal cases, not just political trials. The Sixth Amend-
ment reflects this by stating in its opening words that it applies
to all criminal prosecutions.
An accurate understanding of the historical origins of the
Confrontation Clause requires study of the protections Ameri-
cans thought necessary in ordinary American criminal trials.
Nothing indicates that the secret generation of evidence by the
21. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR
IDENTITY 8 (1980). Jacoby explains:
English common law did not make the sharp division between civil
wrongs and criminal wrongs.... All violations of law were wrongs
committed by an individual against an individual.... A violation of
the King's rights were prosecuted by the King's Attorney. Violations
of individual rights other than the King's were pursued through the
courts by the victim or by his friends or relatives.
id
22. See id In treason trials, the accused was entitled to notice of the
charges ten days before trial; in the ordinary criminal cases notice was not
given until the beginning of trial. In treason trials, the accused had the right
to counsel; in felony trials, the accused did not have right to counsel for the
fact-determination stages. He could have counsel's assistance only on points of
law. The judge, however, had no duty to inform the accused of this limited
right and defense counsel almost never appeared. See THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALExANDER HAMILTON 685-87 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964) (briefly describing
criminal procedure at English common law).
23. The replacement in America of private prosecution by public prosecu-
tion indicates this:
Although the system of private prosecution prevailed in the English
world at the time of the establishment of the first American colonies
.... it quickly vanished in America.... [Private prosecution's] basic
supposition is that crime is essentially a private concern between the
aggressor and the victim.... [Tihe American system conceives of the
criminal act to be a public occurrence and of society as a whole the
ultimate victim.
JACOBY, supra note 21, at 10.
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prosecution was of concern in these cases. Americans, however,
did feel that some criminal convictions were unjust. We need
to examine these cases to understand how Americans of the
constitutional generation thought that such injustices might be
prevented.2A Those thoughts about non-treason trials in
America were certainly reflected in the Sixth Amendment.25
Until this American history is examined, our understanding of
the development of the Confrontation Clause will be
incomplete.
24. The cases to be examined have not been cataloged, but they should in-
clude proceedings such as the Salem witch trials. Only a short time after the
executions of the "witches" in 1692, the public generally saw the convictions as
unjust. By 1697, one of the magistrates and twelve of the jurors had repented
their part in the proceedings, and in 1710, a committee was set up to award
compensation for the survivors. See THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE 4-8 (Donald S.
Thomas, ed., 1972) (briefly describing the proceedings).
The generation that formed the Constitution was aware of and still con-
cerned by these trials, as indicated by Thomas Hutchinson's publication in 1750
of the History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, which presented the doc-
uments of the Salem witch hunt along with a commentary. THOMAS HUTCHIN-
SON, HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSE7TS BAY, reprinted in THE
PUBLIC CONSCIENCE, supra, at 8-51. Hutchinson, who later became governor of
Massachusetts, told his readers that the trials were unfair even though the ac-
cusers faced the accused in open court and even though the trials were not
based on depositions or other evidence secretly generated by the government.
Even so, the procedures were "absurd and dangerous," at least in part because
"[i]nstead of suspecting and shifting the witnesses, and suffering them to be
cross-examined, the authority, to say no more, were imprudent in making use
of leading questions, and thereby putting words into their mouths or suffering
others to do it." Id. at 15, 18-19.
The examinations, although before a jury, were all done by a magistrate.
Hutchinson's description suggests that the generation of the constitutional
framers concluded that this mode of proceeding did not provide sufficient pro-
tections to the accused. The remedy that evolved, it can be argued, was to
grant the accused an attorney and the right to cross-examine. We needed a
system different from the English system of ordinary criminal trials where the
accused is dependent on the authorities to develop the facts.
25. My tentative conclusions are that in the 18th century America, to pro-
duce fairer prosecutions, replaced the English trial system, which was inquisi-
torial-accusatorial, with an adversary system. The most telling evidence of this
is that America granted a right to counsel in all criminal cases while England
did not until 1836. THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note
22, at 686. Americans, however, did not grant counsel in isolation. Instead,
they invariably adopted it with other rights because together they were all
seen as integrally necessary for a more just way of trying cases. Counsel was
tied with notice, confrontation, and compulsory process because together it
was thought these rights produced a fairer criminal justice system. In other
words, I believe, that the history will reveal that a portion of the Sixth
Amendment was meant to constitutionalize what we now call the adversary
system.
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